This paper 1)r(,.sents a nml;ho(t of resolving ambiguity by using ;~ wu'imlt; of cir-(:ums(:ril)l:ion, p'rio'ritizcd circwm, scriptio'm In a disa,ntbigu~tion task, human s/:(',ms to use various t)r(',fcrcnccs whi(:h have various str(mgi;h, hi llrioril,izcd cir-. (:umscription, we (:;m ('.xt)ress thes/', t/references as defe;~sibh~ (:onstr~fints with various strength and we infer the, most 1)referabh ', logical models which s~l,ist',y stronger COllStra,ill|;S ?l,s 11111c]1 as t)ossibh',. This ret)resenl,adon is very m~tu-. ral for (tis;mfl)iguation sin(:c w(; (:;m r(~. ga, rd a logi(:al interprelqal;ion a.s a possibh,. r('.a(ling a.nd 1:lie most prefer;d)lc logical models as the most pr ('.f('.ra,bh'~ r(.'a(l-ings. Wc argue l,hat 1)rioritize.d (:ircums(:ril)tion is a,nol;her promising method for the task. We a]so dis(:uss an imt)hmmntation of l)rioritized (:ircums(:riplion by a hiera.rchi(:a.l logic programlning (]tCIA)) 1;ulgu~tge.
Introduction
']'his p;~pcr presents a lll(.q;llod of (tisa.ml/igu;LdOn t;Lsk 1)y a va.rbmt of (;ircunmcription, prioritized ci 'rcum, scriptiou, (M(:Car|; hy. 1986; l,ifhchitz, 1985) and discuss its iml)h',nlental:ion by a hierarchical l:onstr;I,int logic progrmnming (HCIA)) bmguagc, sltc [l a,s (Borning et al., 1989) . Dis~unl)igua, I;i(/n is a v(',l'y intporl;ant t;ask in mttura.[ bmguage l)ro(:essing. To reso]ve aml)iguity, hunt~ms se, enl to use not only syntactic (:onslxa,ints but a,lso wtrious lev(;ls (1t7 heuristics such as gram- For t~xamtlh'., SUl)pose thai: we have the following SCllt(HICCS. John just saw a man with a telescope. (M He bought the teles('ope yesterday.
(1)) Although dmr(', is ;m alnt)iguil;y on mc;milig of the 1)hrase, "'widt a teh'~scope"(ldw, teh;scot)(; ix either used by ,}ohn or (:arricd by the man), we might conclude t:hc preflwred rc~uling a.~ f'olh)ws.
From dm above sentences. "He" wouhl be equal to .John l)c(:ause tho subject t;ends to be cont.inued t.o the ne.×t sentence }rod .John probably had a telescope at the time of seeing a ma.n fi:om |;he scnteiwe (b) ;u,l ilw.r|;i~ of possession. Therefore. from this prefl:rrcd re;~(ting, we conchuh', that the telescope is used as a, (levi(:(; to sec a man.
However, this re;~ding is not tinal since at least the fl)llowing prcfl'~rences are involved in the above reading and these preferences Call be (teib.~ted 1)y s(;rong(;r hfl'orlm)A;ion. In or(tot to dcmons(;ratc defea.sibilil;y of t)rcfer --o.11(:(! l'ltl('.s, :Ul)t)osc the following S(HItCII(:C is added Then, we migh|; oh;rage ;~ preferred reading th~l; (,he mint should have had a telescope, and dmr(> for('., t;he t(~lcs(:ope was carried by the man at the. time of John's see, ing the man. In this re;uting, a(; legist, (;he following preference rule of mmther inertia of possession is used. ff a I)(',rson gives some.thing to tim other person at time i, then the other l)erson shouhl btve it a,t time j where i < j. This (:onfli(:l,s with (;he 17Orlner semantic preferen(:e of inertia of possession by 1)uying, but the above preference is st, ronger tbm the former since the time of giving is later t;h;m the time of buying. rl'hlls, the folJlllCF t)reference b(~C()lll(R-; 1lO hmer 311-1)licablc by the new scutcncc.
This kind of revision of reading cmmot be rcl)-res('.nl,ed by infl'.ren(:e in (:l;~ssical logic siu(:e in classi(:;d logic, once wc gel; ~ inferred result, we can no hmger rel:ra.(:t the result (monotonic pr'operty) . Therefore, to ml(lerstand tit(,, phenolnen& we need other reasoning met;hods rout in f~(:t, many researches h;tve been using general reasoninn f~am(:works in Artificial Intelligence. such a,s abduction (ttobbs et al., 1993) , prol)abilistic network (Chm'niak and Gohhnan, 1989) , truth lnaint(mance system (Zernik and Brown, 1988) , default logic (Quantz, 1993) and conditional logic (Lascarides, 1993) . In this paper, wc ttropose another alternative, that is, circ,,.m.~cription (McCarthy, 1986 : Lifschitz, 1985 . Even though circumscrit)-tion is one of the most pottular fornlMisn,s in the COllllllllllit, y of llOlllllOllOtOlliC reasoning rcs(,.ar(:h, it is surprishlg that w'.ry few h~ts examined feasibility of (:ircumscrit)tion for disa, mbiguation. Our work of disambiguation by intcrt)retation ordering is originated from (Satoh, 1991) and in a more recent work, Kameymna (Kameyama, 1994) has indcp(mdently propos('.d usage of circumscription for interpretation of pronominal anaphora.
In this paper, we explore this direction further. In circumscription, we give a prefcrclme of der over logical interpretations and consid('.r the most 1)referable models. This representation naturally corrcst)onds with a disambiguation task sin(w. we can regard a logical interpr(~tation as a possible remling, and disaml)igua, tion as a, task to get the most prcf(wal)h; reading among possil)le readlags. Among variants of circumscription, prioritizcd circu.mscriptio'n, is suitable to ret)rcsent various strength of preference rules. In f)rioritized <fir-cumscril)tion, we can (livide preference rules into hiernrchy and this hierarchy giv(,,s a t)riority relation ov(,.r pr(~f('.rences. Therefore, we directly represent rules in the hierarchy in prioritized circumsccil)tion.
We believe, that circumscritttion has the following allvantage, s in the (:ask of resolving ambiguity.
• Since wc use a tirst-order predicate calculus for a basic language, we (:all rot)resent various kinds of inforln;ttion such as grammaticsfl rules and semantical rules in one Damework.
• There is only one extra underlying mc(:hanism besides iufi'.rellC(', rules for the first-order predicate cah:ulus, that; is, introducing an order over h)gical interltretations. Therefore, re.asoning process (:an be un(hwstoo(l easily COlnt)ared to other lnechallisln using numerical reasoning or comt)h:x inferca(:(; rules.
• We (lo not nec(l to assign detailed mlmcri(:al values to t)referellce rules in ord(;r to express t)riority over t)r(~ference rules, but just specify a t)ref(:rence level of the rules. This representation can t)e regar(led as all assignment of qualitative strength for 1)ref (~l'ell(;(~ rules all([ reduces a ] )ur(letl of tel)-resenting a ttriority over preference rules gready. Moreover, this prioritization is general since we can repr(~sent a various kind of priority besides specilicity.
• It is important to retain 1)ossible readings if we can not w.solve aml)iguity yet. In cir(:umscripLion, we can consider multiple preferable models, not nec(;ssary the single pr@rable model. So, if ther(~ are yet multiple possible readings as a result of disambiguation, we can keep these possit)le readings as multiple i)retb.rat/le lnodels.
In this l)aper, we also dis(:uss an implenmnration by using hierarchical constraint logic programlning (HCLP) language sltch as (Borning ct al., 1989). HCLP language is similar to constraint h)gic progralnming bmguage except that we (;nil represent a constraint hierm:dly. Thus, there is a corrcst/on(lencc l/ctwecn a solution of an HCLP language and the most t)rcferablc models of prioritized circunmcription. Ill this patter, we use our HCLP language based on a l)oolean constraint solver to get tlJ(', most t)rcferal)lc models from t)refer(mce rules rot)resented as bo(/h,,mt constraints in tlt(', HC'L1 ) language. Wc demonstrate how the. ;fi)ove example of the disalnbiguation is tre;~ted in tlm HCLP language.
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Prioritized Circumscription
In this section, we briefly review prioritized circmnscritltion. For simI)licity sake, we modify the definition of prioritize(l circumscril)tiol, by (McCarthy, 1986; Lifschitz, 1985) . The difference is that we let all t)rcdical;es vary and lnaximize preference rules whereas Lifschitz mininfize abnormal predicates for prefercnc(', rlth~s.
Let cI)(x) and ~P(x) be formulas with th(! same nulnller of fre(~ w,.riables x. We say (,hat ¢) and ~P are similar. ¢1) > ~I/ stands for Vx(~II(x) D (P(x)). We extend this notation to tuples of formubm ep, ~IJ wllQFC ( Let a tuph', of formulas 4) be broken into disjoillt parts q51 , (1) 
We also wril;e (1) ~ vii A ~(~It _ ~I)) as • ~ iP.
Definition 1 Let A(P) be a formula, and (D(P) be a tuple of formulas wh, ich, is brokcn into 4il(P),4,2(P) ..... (1) ',,d M have lb.c .~a,'m,c do'm,o,i,~,. 2. cm"U/ co 'n,.,#,an,/, a,'n,d, fu,'n, cl, io'n, .s!/'m, bol k,a,.s /k,e ,sa, w,c i',,tcrprclatio'n, in 'l'he a,lmvc, order h~tuidvcly me,ms I,ha, l: logical int, cq)rtfl;~d,iotts which m~txi-ma,lly sa,lis[y a, subsel, ot7 ~li ~ ;brt~ prNTcrM,lt!, a,nd if l,htu'(! arc iul,crprel,a,l,ious which mLl,isf~g lit(', mmm ft)rllllll~ts ill q)l. l,hcll iltt,crl)rt'.l,;tt;iOllS which ma,ximaAly smisfy ~t subsel; of ~1)2 i~rc prcfvra,blc, aml... a,nd if l here arc intc.rprtfl;a,I;ions which sal,isf'y dtc sa,me t'orn)ul~ts in (1) ['hcIl, l;[IC IIIOSI, pl"cfcr~dJc models corrcsl)ond wil;h l;hc most l)refcra,1)lc rcmliugs since C;-Lt;h tltodc] s~4islies Sl,l'onp~(!r 1)rt4't',rtm(:e ruh~s a,s much a,s pt)ssil)lt' m.l l,herct'ore, t ht! syl~l,a,t:l,ic definiliou bt!ctmms a Slmt:ilit:M, ion o[ l.he l~refcra,lflc rea,ding,~ by Fhc, mtm I.
Disambiguation by Prioritized
In l,hc subst!(lucnl, std),sct:l:ions, w(' lirsdy fix mt C, Xl)erimtml~d h)gica,l represenla, l,ion of S(!lli;elt(:es. I)a.t;l(grt)und kuowlcdgt: m.t prt:ferences. Then. we 
A(dc' ,'~,ct ( t . I , lcscotm ) V(timu( E', 7') A m:t(E', llo, vt:)
The laM: CoIIjllIICt; c.xpre.sst~s mnbiguity in l,he l)hra,sc ' "wilah ~t I clcst:opc." (used ~ts ~L devit:e or cartied by 1,11(': ma,n).
In tahiti,toll I:o l, he SClH;tttl,i(: rel)l'CSCld,a.l,ion, we also use synl,acl,it:M informal>ion fl't)n~ a, tmrser so l;ha[; gr~tlttln~d,i(:aJ 1)r(~ft~r(,,lt(;(: rlll(',s (:~tH H(', exl)rcsscd. For ex~mq)le, we show some of tim gr,m> mal,it:;d inforlmtl:ion of l, hc s(HII;tHIcc "',John gatve dm I clcscopt~ l;t) l,he ma, n'" ;ts follows. (We assunm t,hM, stml;ct|cc munl)cr is 1). Ai'n, _thc._, ~tm, te'., cc( 1, , h)It, ~, ) Hy usi Ig dtcsc l)¢Lsi(: t)rcdic;tl,es, w('. t:ml rcpl'(',SC, lll, l)~u:kground klmwh;dgt: which m:c ~dwa,ys wdid. For cxmnpb. I)a,cl(ground knowlcdgc~ "q]' a,l has o al l imt,. i, ~md a,l is not equal t,o ~2, I;hcn we dots not, ha,vc o atl; I;imc {'" c;ut t)e t'.xprcssed in l,he followi nl~; formula ~ • imtting stronger preferences into a stronger hierarchy of l)references.
For example, consider the following two grammarital preferences.
1. If "He" appears in a sellteltce as the subject and the subject in the previous sentence is male, then it is 1)referal)le that "He" refers to the previous subject.
2. If "He" appears in a sentence as the subject ~tnd someone in the previous sentence is male, then it is preferable that "He" refers to the one in the t)revious sentence.
Suppose that the former is stronger than the latter. This priority of the t)references means that the formula:
(isa(a, Male) A subj(i, a) Ain~th, e_sentence(i + 1, He)) D eq(a, He)(3)
shouht be satisfied as much as possible for every a and i, and if it is maximally satisfied then the following forinnla:
( isa( a, Male) A in_the_sentence(i, a) Ain_thc_sentcnce(i + 1, He)) D eq(a, He) (4)
shouhl be satisfied as much as possible for every a and i. We can represent semantic preferences as well. For exalnple, a preference "If al sees a2, then a2 and al are not equal" means that the following expression shouhl be satisfied as nmch ~s possible for (;very e, (t,1 and a2: (
act(e, See)A actor(e, a,1)A object(e, az)) D (5) =eq(a2, a,1 )
Note that the Mmw; is a preference rule because there is a possibility of reflexive use of "see".
Example
Now, we are ready to treat disamhiguation of the sentences used in Section 1 by prioritized circumscription. We consider the following l)ackground knowledge which is always true. We denote the conjunctions of the following ;~ioms as A0(P) where p d~.f (eq, is, time, act, actor, object, recipient, device, sub j, in_the_sentence) .
1. If al is equal to a2 then a2 is eqnM to az. ValVa2(eq(al, a2) D eq(a2, al))
2. If al and o,2 are equal and a2 and aa are equal, then al and a3 are equal.
ValVa2Va3 ((eq(al, a2 ) A eq(a2, a3 )) D eq(al, a3 )) 3. if al is equM to a2, then a2 is an actor of al's action, too.
VeValVa2((cq(al,a2) A actor(e, al)) D aetor(e, a,:~ ))
4. if a use o as a device at time i then a has o at tilne i.
VeViVaVo((ti,ne(c, i) A actor(e, a) Adeviee(e, o)) D 3e I (time(el, i) A act(el, Have) Aactor( el, a) A object(el, o)))
5. If al has o at time i, and al is not equal to a2, then a2 does not have o at time i. This is same as (2).
We consider the following preferences.
1. If ax sees a2, then ax and a2 are not equM.
• (P, e, =
2. If a is lnale and a is the snbject of i-th sentence and "He" is in the next sentence, then a is equal to :'He".
• 2(P, e, a,i) = (3) 3. If a is rome and a is in i-tll sentence and "He" is in the next sentence, then a is equM to "He". ¢Pa (P, a, i) = (4) 4. If someone gives o to a at time i, then a has o at time i + 1. This expresses inertia of ownership. We assmne that ~ is a formula which should; be satisfied in the first place, O~ in the second place, (pa ~ in the third place, q54 in the fourth place and • ) in the fifth place.
= (act(e, Give) A object(e, o) Arecipient(e, a) A time(e, i)) D
Example 1 We con.sider the following sentences.
John just saw a man with a telescope. He bought the telescope yesterday.
A logical representation of the above sentences ix as folh)ws and we denote it as AI(P). Ai'n, _thc_sc'n, tcncc( 2, He) NoLe thaL we represent "just" as Lime 2 and "yesterday'" a.s time 0.
In t, he synLa(:tic deiinil;ion of the lliOSl; prefer-M,le reading (I), we let A(P) be &(P)A At(P) and /~: I)e 5.
We show an intuitive ext)l;ulation of inferen(:e of geLLing tl,e most t)referM)le reading as [i)llows.
F'rom the preference 2, "lie" preferably refers t,() ,lohn. NoLe LhaL although t, he t)reference 3 seems Lo l)e alq)li(:able, iL is noL acLually used since the stronger prefcre, nce 2 overrides Lhe preferen(:c 3.
Thell, from Lhe preference 5, John had l;he telescope el: Lime 2. Frolll Lhe t)reference l, .lohn is not equM to the, mau. Then, the man (:aunol: have l:he Leles(:ope, at Lime 2 front l;he l)a(:kground knowledge 5 and l;herefore, t;he t:eh;seope was used as a device fi-om the disjuncLiol~ iu A1 (P). We ca.n a (:-l,ua.lly prove tha, t &:vice(l':l,telescop(:) is l,rue in t, he most 1)referM)le remlings.
Example 2 Suppose we add the following sen-/once t,o the p'rcvious scnl, e'n, ces. But, he gave the telescope to the man this morning.
A logi(:al representation relate(t I;o this Sclll;ence is as follows. We denot;e the fornml;t as A~(P). l, dl;,( E3, (-~i',,e In l;his case, we h;t a(P) be A0(P) A A~(P) A A2(P) in the synta(:t:ie definil;ion. The, u, reading of "'widl ~t t;elescol)e" is (:hanged. From l:he pret: erence 4, Lhe 1,H-Ln shouhl have had Lhe l;eles(:ot)e a(; I;ilne 2. if the, (;eles(:ol)e were used as a device el; dnle 2, John wouhl Mso have Lhe Leles(:ot)e aL dm same time a(:(:ording to background knowledge 4 and it (:ontradiets background knowledge 5. Then, the weaker t)referen(-c 5 is rel;r~cl,ed Lo ~woid contradiction and the stronger preference 4 is survived. Therefore, in l;he mosL t)refera,1)le rea,ding, Lhe ll [;l, li h~ul Lh(,' telescot)e at l;inle 2.
HCLP language
Now. we discuss an imt)lementation of prioritized (:iv(:ulns(:ritfl:ion by IICI~P. FirsLly, we briefly review ~t hi(,r;Lrchi(:M consLrainL logic l)rogr~ttn -ming(HCM )) language. We follow t.he definition of (l~orning el; M., 1989 To solve (:onstrainL hierar(:hy, we firstly lind a m;~ximal subseL of constraints for the strongest level which is (:onsistent with the require(l constrMnl;s. Then, we try to find a inaximM subset of consLraints in the se(:ond strongest, level with respe(:l: to t, he union of the. required consLrMnt, s and Lhe lnaximal (:onsisl;ent subset for l.h(; sLrongest, level .... and so on until a maximM consisl;ent subset of COltsLraints in the k-th strongest, level is added. The.n, an assignment which satisfies t;1,e final seL of consl;r:tinl;s is eMled a sol,.tio'n,.
O a.,t be assignm,;nts C0'(and t)e a se.t of constraints in the strongest, level of tl,e hierarchy sat, istied t)y 0(amt o), and C~(and ~2 C¢) l)e ~L set; of (:onstrMnts in the secon(l strongest level of t.he hierarchy satisfied by 0(and a) .... , an(l C~'(,md C a:).~ be a set of (:onstrMnt.s in f.he t,>f.il strongest level of Lhe. hierarchy satisfied by 0(an(t (7). ,,na c:; c
We can prove thaL if 0 is a solution, t, hen there is no assignment ~r which satisfies the required (:onstrMnLs and is locally-predicate-better than 0.
Note l;hal; t;ll(: definition of loeally-t)redicatel)etter (:onlpm'~to," is similar to the definition of the orde, r over logical interpretation in the t)rioritized cir(:umscription. The difference is that locally-1)redicate-better (:omparator (:onsiders assignment:s for variabh,,s in constraint;s in IICLP whereas t, he order over h)gical interpret.aLton COilsiders ~msignmenl;s of truth-value for formulas in 1)rioritized circumscril)tion.
Implementation by HCLP language
In order to use, HCLI ) l,~nguage h)r iml)lemen~ation of prioritizcd (:ireunmcripdon, we need Lo change t'ornnflas in 1)rioritized circumscription into (:onsl:raints in tlCLP. It is done as follows. We introduce a domain closure axiom so Lhat we only consider relevant constants used in the given senten(:es. Then, we inst;mtiztte universM-quandfied variM)le, s in background knowledge mM free variables in preferen(:es wit, h the relevmlt (:onsL;mts and iul~rodu(:e Skolean fimctions for existentialqua.ntified variables. which lllCa,llS thai: the mint ha,s t, he t(~lescot)(~ (a, ll(1 il; is not used a,s ~ device).
tim, c(ET,
2
6
Conclusion
We belicw; tim, l: dw, following are conl:ribul,ions of this 1)~tmr.
